introduction
With increasing reliance on cloud infrastructure, organizations must be vigilant against potential extortion threats targeting misconfigurations and weak access controls. Unfortunately, blackmail threats are a big problem. According to Verizon's 2024 Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR), “nearly one-third of all breaches are related to ransomware or some other extortion technique.” In theory, an attack could leverage exposed files and credentials to infiltrate cloud environments, escalate privileges, and possibly filter sensitive data.
This blog will address how such an attack could occur, explain MITER ATT&CK tactics and techniques relevant to this scenario, and highlight critical best practices for securing cloud environments.
How an extortion attack could unfold
Extortion threats are characterized by the fact that the attacker is looking to use the leaked data to extort money.
Here's how it could happen: Consider a scenario in which attackers use automated tools to search for publicly exposed environment files (for example, .env). These files often contain cloud access keys, database credentials, and API tokens that can enable attackers to compromise cloud environments and abuse access rights.
Attackers can leverage various MITER ATT&CK tactics and techniques to achieve their goals, establish a persistent foothold and escalate their privileges.
MITRE ATT&CK Framework: Key Tactics and Techniques
Initial Access (T1078 – Valid Accounts): An attacker may gain access using compromised credentials found in exposed .env files or misconfigured global permissions. Discovery (T1580 – Cloud Infrastructure Discovery): After access, attackers can use API calls such as GetCallerIdentity or ListBuckets to collect information about the cloud environment's structure and resources. Privilege Escalation (T1548 – Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism): If initial credentials are insufficient for their goals, attackers may exploit misconfigured permissions to create new roles with escalated privileges, allowing broader access within the cloud infrastructure. Persistence (T1136 – Create Account): Attackers may create long-term credentials or new accounts to prove persistence within the environment, allowing them to retain access to future malicious activity. Implementation (T1072 – Software Deployment Tools): Using compromised permissions, attackers can deploy malicious functions, such as AWS Lambda functions, to automate scanning for additional vulnerabilities across other domains. Collection (T1530 – Data from Cloud Storage): Once sensitive cloud resources are identified and accessed, attackers can download files from cloud storage, filtering sensitive data for ransom or further exploitation. Filtration (T1048 – Alternate Protocol Filtration): Attackers can move stolen data outside the environment using API calls or other tools, then leave ransom notes demanding payment in exchange for not leaking or selling the data.
The role of automation in expanding the scope of attacks
Automation will allow attackers to implement these tactics and techniques at scale, targeting hundreds or thousands of potential victims without manual intervention. Cloud-native tools and functions, like AWS Lambda, can automate scans across regions and domains, dramatically increasing a campaign's reach.
Potential attack impact
An attack of this type can have serious repercussions for organizations, including:
Data loss and compliance breaches: Sensitive data leaks can result in legal and regulatory consequences. Ransom demands: Attackers may leave ransom notes, demanding payment to prevent public release of stolen data. Credential abuse: Exposed credentials can enable attackers to launch more phishing or malicious campaigns, amplifying the damage.
Key security measures to mitigate extortion threats
To protect against potential extortion attacks, organizations should implement the following security practices:
1. Secure Environment Files: Protect files containing environment variables (.env) and other sensitive configurations by restricting access controls and avoiding public exposure.
Qualys Control IDs:
Control ID – 45: The S3 bucket access control list grants access to everyone or authorized users.
Control ID – 46: S3 bucket policy grants access to everyone.
2. Credential rotation and mitigation: Use temporary credentials that automatically expire to limit the impact if they are compromised. Rotate credentials regularly to reduce the risk of unauthorized access.
Qualys Control IDs:
Control ID – 2: Make sure to disable console credentials that are not in use for 45 days or more.
Control ID – 4: Be sure to rotate Access Switch 1 every 90 days or less.
Control ID – 5: Be sure to rotate the Access Switch 2 every 90 days or less.
Control ID – 14: Make sure there is no access key to the root user account.
3. Follow principles of least privilege: Ensure that IAM roles, users, and policies have only the minimum required permissions, reducing the risk of privilege escalation by attackers.
Qualys Control IDs:
Control ID – 17: Make sure that IAM policies are only associated with groups or roles.
Control ID – 18: Eliminate the use of the root user for administrative and daily tasks.
Control ID – 50: Ensure that IAM policies that allow full administrative privileges *:* are not attached.
Control ID – 400: Ensure that the IAM user cannot access the console.
Control ID – 417: Ensure that IAM policies that allow full administrative privileges have not been created.
4. Monitor for anomalies: Implement threat detection tools that alert security teams to unusual activity, such as unexpected API calls or attempts to access data. Solutions like AWS GuardDuty or third-party monitoring tools can help detect these activities.
Qualys Control IDs:
Control ID – 19: Make sure CloudTrail is enabled in all regions.
Control ID – 387: Make sure GuardDuty is enabled for the specific organization/region.
5. Automate response actions: Use automated response mechanisms to disable compromised accounts, rotate exposed credentials, and restrict access to sensitive resources immediately upon detection of suspicious activity.
To automate response actions, Qualys' CDR tool helps detect known and unknown threats in real-time using deep learning AI.
The automatic remediation capability within Qualys TotalCloud allows detected security issues and misconfigurations in cloud environments to be automatically fixed. This provides a “one-click” remediation option to quickly address vulnerabilities and compliance concerns without manual intervention, often through pre-defined workflows and integrations with cloud provider APIs.
conclusion
By understanding the potential tactics and techniques used in cloud extortion campaigns, organizations can better defend against them. Following best practices, such as securing sensitive configuration files, applying least privileged access, and automated incident response, can significantly reduce the risk of falling victim to extortion and similar cloud-based attacks.
Constant vigilance and proactive measures are essential to protect cloud environments from evolving threats. Incorporating these security practices will enhance your ability to combat extortion and other cloud security risks.
